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Understanding the choices of civilians and combatants is crucial to our research on civil 
war and post-conflict reconstruction. We want to know, for example, why people join 
rebels and militias, why families decide to flee, why combatants kill, how they expand to 
new territories, or why locals support or boycott counterinsurgency operations. Even when 
we ask questions about macro-level outcomes such as the duration of war, the stability of 
peace agreements, or the effects of peace keeping operations, our capacity to theorize and 
interpret empirical results depends at least partially on our assumptions about how actors 
make decisions on the ground.  
Despite the general agreement that institutions—understood as rules that structure 
human interaction—shape behavior, the study  of  how civilians and combatants  make 
choices in war zones has, for the most part, neglected the role of wartime institutions. 
Overlooking institutions in the analysis of individual and collective behavior would be 
astonishing in any field in political science; however, it has endured in civil war studies 
perhaps because war is assumed to be chaotic and anarchic, as the widespread use of 
concepts such as failed states (e.g. Ghani and Lockhart 2008) and collapsed governance 
(e.g. Milliken 2003) suggests. 
Yet,  the  emergence  of  local  institutions  in  the  midst  of  war  makes  sense 
theoretically. To start with, war often brings about, or exacerbates, the collapse of formal 
state institutions. Different literatures have shown that in contexts where access to effective 
institutions is lacking, new informal institutions are likely to emerge. For example, rural 
communities that depend on limited, public natural resources, often develop norms that 
facilitate  collective  action  (Ostrom,  1990).  Illegal  markets  where  property  rights  and   3 
contracts cannot be enforced by the law also tend to develop their own parallel institutions 
(e.g. Gambetta, 1996; Skarbek, 2011; Varese, 2001; Volkov, 2000). The emergence of the 
state itself has been explained as a process whereby one actor offers institutions and 
protection in exchange for taxation, transforming a situation of anarchy into one where 
clear norms allow for higher predictability, productive activities, and capital accumulation 
(e.g. Olson, 1993; Tilly, 1985 skarpedas). Even within contexts where formal institutions 
do operate, actors often attempt to provide private orderings to “realign incentives and 
embed transactions in more protective governance structures” (Williamson, 2002; see also 
Dixit, 2007). These insights suggest that as pre-war institutions collapse in war zones, some 
sort of new institutions are likely to emerge. 
The existence of wartime institutions should not surprise us for another simple 
reason: the warring sides have incentives to create them. First, as Tilly (1978) suggests, in 
order to overcome their competitors, the warring sides try to monopolize the means of 
violence, extract resources from local inhabitants and, at the same time, promote capital 
accumulation. Even though Tilly was referring to a long historical process, armed actors 
fighting civil wars are likely to learn that in order to advance their cause, they need to create 
a sustainable system of resource extraction to fund their operations. Such system, in turn, 
requires some security and limited taxation for civilians to engage in productive activities 
(Olson 1993)—in other words, it requires institutions.2 
A second reason why armed groups are likely to create institutions has to do with 
the kind of warfare they engage in. Most contemporary civil wars are characterized by 
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irregular warfare—that is, a contest “entailing an asymmetric rebel challenge launched 
from the country’s rural periphery” (Kalyvas & Balcells, 2010). In such wars, rebels’ 
modus  operandi  entails  seizing  control  over  pockets  of  territory,  creating  a  growing 
challenge to the state. Although violence is a key means to achieve and maintain such 
control (Kalyvas, 2006), creating institutions to rule local populations is essential as well 
(Arjona, 2013). The mere creation of order facilitates population monitoring and increases 
the  odds  of  voluntary  cooperation,  which  is  essential  for  maintaining  control 
(Guevara  Brian Loveman, and Thomas M. Davies, 1985; Kalyvas, 2006; Mao, 1978). In 
addition, specific institutions allow rebels to shape economic, political, and social affairs 
in  ways  that  benefit  their  organization.  Such  institutions  may,  for  example,  facilitate 
recruitment, provide access to political networks, allow for the accumulation of material 
resources, and even put in practice their ideology by implementing promised reforms 
(Arjona, Kasfir, & Mampilly, 2014; Arjona, 2013; Mampilly, 2011).  
Empirical evidence on civil wars across the globe supports these theoretical priors. 
Some form of order often emerges in war zones, where norms are clear and enforced. Since 
these norms can vary greatly, the institutional arrangements that operate in war zones can 
be quite diverse.  
In this paper I argue that such contexts need to be incorporated in our study of civil 
war, and propose a research agenda on local wartime institutions. I focus on the locality 
because war often segments territory, making localities the key locus of choice. To advance 
this research agenda, I first show that there is, indeed, great variation in wartime local 
institutions  by  relying  on  systematic,  quantitative  and  qualitative  original  data  on 
Colombia. Second, I propose a way to conceptualize the set of norms and arrangements   5 
that structure political, economic, and social interactions in war zones; for this purpose, I 
introduce the concept of wartime social order, present a typology, and assess its quality 
both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, I argue that the typology identifies a 
variation that is relevant: we have reasons to inquire about its causes, and we can expect it 
to  influence  other  important  phenomena  both  during  wartime  and  in  its  aftermath. 
Empirically, I use cluster analysis to show that the typology identifies distinct types—that 
is, they are internally homogenous but differ drastically from each other. I also argue that 
the typology is parsimonious because it identifies only three types but  still has great 
descriptive and explanatory potential. Finally, I discuss how this typology could advance 
our understanding of different  wartime and postwar phenomena and make a plea for 
incorporating institutions to our study of micro-, meso- and macro-level outcomes. My 
goal is not to provide a theory of wartime institutions3; rather, this paper seeks to show that 
different institutional arrangements emerge in war zones, argue that they warrant attention, 
and offer a way to conceptualize them. 
I proceed as follows. In the first section I discuss why we need a research agenda 
on wartime local  institutions. In the second section I present data on wartime local 
institutions in Colombia to   give the reader a sense of the phenomenon w e  are to 
conceptualize, and the scope of its variation. In the third section I introduce the concept of 
wartime social order and the typology, and assess its quality.  In the  fourth  section I 
conclude by discussing specific ways in which this approach can contribute to our study of 
civil war. 
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1. Why study local wartime institutions? 
Studies of civil war focus on research questions at different levels: at the macro level, they 
seek to identify the conditions under which civil wars start, end, and resume; why some 
produce greater deaths than others; or how particular ways of ending a conflict shape post-
conflict  paths  (e.g.  Fortna 2004;  Fearon and  Laitin  2003;  Collier and Hoeffler  2004; 
Downes 2008). 4 At the micro-level, recent research has focused mostly on the causes of 
killings (Kalyvas 2006; Balcells 2010, Metelits 2010), sexual violence (Wood 2008), and 
displacement (Steele 2010; Ibañez and Vélez 2008); the determinants of participation, 
mobilization, and recruitment (Arjona & Kalyvas, 2007; Humphreys & Weinstein, 2008; 
Parkinson,  2013;  Petersen,  2001;  Wood,  2003);  and  the  individual-level  effects  of 
interventions  to  foster reintegration, reconciliation,  and development  (Humphreys  and 
Weinstein 2007; Gilligan et. al 2011).  
Either explicitly or implicitly, studies at both levels rely on assumptions about the 
ways in which civilians and combatants make choices on the ground. This is obvious when 
we think of questions like recruitment or collaboration: we are inquiring directly about a 
decision of an individual. But even when we ask about macro-level outcomes, our theories 
tend to rely on some assumption about why people behave in the way they do. For example, 
theories of civil war onset rely on assumptions about why people launch rebel movements 
and why others decide to join them. True, a theory might start with the wrong assumptions 
and still get the general causal link right; when it comes to deriving implications, however, 
micro-foundations and mechanisms can make a stark difference as false assumptions may 
lead to wrong theoretical deductions and policy recommendations. Here is where the 
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locality  becomes  crucial:  if  we  want  to  model  decision-making—either  because  our 
question is about a choice or because we need to make assumptions about it—we need to 
rely on a realistic understanding of the context in which that choice is being made. In most 
civil wars, such context is the locality. 
Civil war has a tremendous capacity to segment space (Kalyvas 2006:88, McColl 
1969; Thompson 1983). While a town lives under full control of the national army, the 
town up the hill lives under rebel control, and the one down in the valley is under dispute. 
In the blooming literature on the micro-level dynamics of war, scholars have started to take 
into account the role that local-level factors play in shaping different outcomes, like how 
pre-war local elections shape wartime violence (Balcells 2010) and displacement (Steele 
2010; Balcells and Steele 2012); how state repression shapes civilian support for the rebels 
(Wood 2003; Petersen 2001; Lyall 2009); and how territorial control shapes violence and 
collaboration (Kalyvas 2006). However, few authors have attempted to conceptualize, 
systematically describe, and theorize those different local realities that emerge amidst war, 
in which actors live and interact.  
Some recent studies give clues about how those local realities might look like. The 
work of anthropologists on wartime governance (e.g. Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2004; 
Lubekman 2008; Förster 2012) depicts daily life in areas where rebels, incumbents, and 
international  actors  interact  with  civilians.  Wood’s  (2008:539)  analysis  of  the 
transformation  of  social  processes  in  war  makes  a  key  contribution  by  highlighting 
different ways in which “social actors, structures, norms, and practices” are transformed 
by war. (Arjona, 2009) discusses the coexistence of different local orders in war zones, 
showing evidence of variation in who rules, in what domains, with what enforcement   8 
mechanisms, and establishing what kind of relation with the local population. Staniland 
(2012)  focuses  on  the  different  relations  between  states  and  insurgents—which  he 
conceptualizes as wartime political orders—bringing to the fore the different ways in which 
power can be allocated between incumbents and insurgents. An emerging field on rebel 
governance identifies and theorizes variation in rebels’ ruling strategies (Arjona et al., 
2014; Kasfir, 2005; Mampilly, 2011; Metelits, 2010; Weinstein, 2007).  
These  studies  have  certainly  improved  our  mental  image  of  conflict  areas. 
However, we need ways to conceptualize the overall institutional contexts in which actors 
live.  In  as  much  as  these  local  realities  are  the  locus  of  key  choices,  we  need  to 
conceptualize them, theorize their origins, how they function, and how they might shape 
decision-making. It is useful to think of such realities as “regimes”: if there is something 
like local regimes in war zones, we need to incorporate them in our analyses. 
Before proposing a concept  and a typology that  can move us  forward  in  this 
direction,  I  present  evidence  of  the  existence  of  wartime  local  institutions  and  their 
variation. 
 
2. Local wartime institutions: evidence on Colombia 
Localities in conflict areas often become microcosms with their own political, social, and 
economic  institutions.  By  institutions  I  mean  the  set  of  rules  that  structure  human 
interaction in a given community. In conflict areas these are rarely formal, to be sure, but 
people tend to know them quite well as rebels (and counter-rebels) often strictly enforce 
them. In this section I present data from what I believe is the first systematic dataset on 
wartime local institutions. I collected the data in 2010 and 2012 on random samples of   9 
Colombian localities where guerrilla or paramilitary groups have been present for at least 
six months since 1970. The goal of presenting this data is twofold: first, I aim to show that 
institutions do exist in war zones; and second, that they vary greatly over time and space, 
across  and  within  armed  actors,  and  across  and  within  localities.  I  start  with  a  brief 
overview of the Colombian conflict; I then describe the method for gathering the data; I 
then present evidence on economic, political, and social institutions operating in conflict 
zones. 
 
A brief overview of the Colombian conflict 
 The ongoing Colombian conflict started in the 1960s, right after a previous bloody war 
had  ended.  Several  leftist  guerrilla  groups  were  formed,  including  the  Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). Both groups 
described themselves as popular liberation movements seeking to bring about social justice 
and communism.  
The conflict had a low intensity for several  years; in the 1970s, however, the 
guerrillas began to expand into new areas of the country. They moved from poor and 
isolated places to areas that were closer to the center and had higher incomes and resources 
(Vélez 1999; Echandía 1999). They engaged in extortion, kidnapping, taxation, and drug 
cultivation and trafficking, which provided abundant resources. This growth, both in terms 
of geographical expansion and scope of activities, affected the interests of local elites in 
several regions of the country, particularly in the north. During this decade the FARC 
became the largest and most powerful of the guerrilla groups, followed by the ELN. Both 
groups were (and still are) highly disciplined. According to available estimates, by the late   10 
1990s about three fourths of all Colombian municipalities had some form of presence of 
either of these organizations (Echandía 1999).  
In part reacting to the threats that the guerillas posed to them, and in part responding 
to national-level changes such as decentralization, local elites began to form paramilitary 
forces. Although a few were self-defense groups organized by peasants, most were set up 
by landowners, cattle-raisers, emerald-traders, and drug traffickers (Romero 2003). At first, 
these  paramilitary  groups  operated  separately  in  different  areas  of  the  country.  They 
financed their operations with a combination of taxes on economic activities in areas under 
their control, voluntary and forced regular payments by locals, and drug trafficking. Even 
though the state did  not  create these groups  directly, there is  substantial  evidence of 
collusion as well as of silent toleration, including negligence in stopping instances of 
massive victimization of civilians.5 In addition, these groups managed to create very strong 
ties with local and regional political figures, which are now well documented by journalists 
and academics.6 In 1997 most paramilitary groups united under an umbrella organization 
called  the United Self -Defense  Forces  of Colombia  (AUC). Although  some of the 
operations of the blocs were planned at the level of the AUC, each bloc preserved a high 
degree of independence.  Overall, paramilitary groups were less disciplined than their 
guerrilla counterparts.  
Due  to the growth of the guerrillas   and the emergence and expansion of the 
paramilitaries, the armed conflict escalated throughout the 1980s, and reached a peak in 
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the late 1990s. However, according to most sources, the amount of violence decreased in 
the mid-2000s (Security and Democracy Foundation 2006).   
Different peace negotiations and demobilization processes have taken place during 
the last two decades. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, several leftist guerrilla groups 
demobilized collectively and were given amnesty (like the M-19 and the Quintin Lame). 
Under the Uribe government (2002-2010), thousands of individual members of the FARC 
and the ELN deserted, but both groups are still active. Most paramilitary groups negotiated 
with  the  government  and  demobilized  their  members,  although  new  groups  quickly 
emerged and are now active in many regions of the country, mostly dedicated to drug 
trafficking and illegal mining. Although guerrilla groups are weakened, they are still active 
and have intensified their operations  as  a new peace process  with  the government  is 
currently underway. 
The Colombian conflict differs from many others in its duration: it is one of the 
longest internal armed conflicts that are still ongoing. This could raise doubts about the 
generalizability of the dynamics that we can find in this case. However, while some regions 
have coexisted with armed groups for forty years, others became war zones only recently. 
In addition, the country exhibits internal variation in almost every dimension that one might 
expect to matter in an investigation of wartime institutions: some armed groups have been 
operating  for  decades,  while  others  were  formed  in  recent  years;  some  regions  have 
valuable legal natural resources like gold, others have coca leaves, and others lack any of 
such goods; ethnicity varies across and within regions; both left-wing and right-wing 
groups operate; and state capacity varies greatly over time and space. Hence, despite its   12 
uniqueness as a long conflict, the Colombian case is well suited for investigating many 
aspects of the conduct of war. 
 
Measuring wartime local institutions 
Although the importance of informal institutions has been largely acknowledged (e.g. 
Dasgupta and Sergaldin 2000, Helmke and Levistky 2001), methods to measure them are 
surprisingly scarce. Measuring informal institutions during conflict makes the task even 
harder. Using a novel approach, I gathered detailed data on wartime institutions in 57 
communities throughout Colombia in 2010 and 2012. In what follows, I briefly describe 
the sampling strategy and the data gathering approach.   
I selected a set of municipalities where at least one armed group had been present 
in the past four decades, stratified by region to ensure geographical variation. These regions 
included 27 of the 33 departments of the country (the equivalent to US states). I excluded 
five departments located in the Amazonian region, which are under-populated and where 
the  armed  conflict  has  only  recently  arrived. 7 In total, the two samples include 30 
municipalities throughout Colombia. The sample is quite diverse along several dimensions, 
including location, ethnicity, economic activities, abundance of legal and illegal natural 
resources, the structure of land tenure, and historical patron-client relations. By virtue of 
the geographical variation, the sample also includes very different conflict dynamics: some 
municipalities were strongholds of the FARC since the 1970s, while others have only 
experienced rebel presence since the 2000s. Likewise, some municipalities were bastions 
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of paramilitary groups between in 1990s, while others encountered these organizations 
much later. Patterns of violence also vary greatly across municipalities, as do patterns of 
counterinsurgency and anti-narcotics policy. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of proxies 
of ethnic composition, state presence, social conditions, infrastructure, natural resources, 
and violence. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of sampled municipalities 
 
 
 
 
 
Municipality Department % Indigenous 
2005
% Afro Colombian 
2005 % Poor 2005 Roads index 1985 % Households 
with electricity Coca crops 2000
Oil, gold, coal 
or emeralds 
2006
Average 
homicide rate 
per 100,000 
inhabitants 
1988-2010
Apartad￳ Antioquia 0.6% 40.2% 52.4% 70 97.88 0 0 8.4
Carolina Antioquia 0.0% 0.6% 41.6% 56 99.15 0 0 3.3
Itagui Antioquia 0.0% 6.1% 23.1% 100 92.29 0 0 3.5
Cravo Norte Arauca 0.6% 0.0% 68.9% 0 0.28 0 0 33.7
Magangué Bolívar 0.0% 15.3% 73.0% 71 78.3 0 0 3.9
Aquitania Boyacá 0.0% 0.1% 67.0% 97 100 0 0 3.0
La Uvita Boyacá 0.0% 0.1% 66.2% 54 99.51 0 0 2.6
Manizales Caldas 0.2% 0.9% 29.6% 100 26.37 0 0 1.7
Puerto Rico Caquetá 2.1% 5.8% 73.3% 77 67.11 1 0 13.6
Hato Corozal Casanare 12.2% 0.2% 79.9% 49 0.96 0 0 9.5
Villanueva Casanare 0.3% 3.0% 53.9% 44 0 0 19.7
Silvia Cauca 79.6% 0.2% 77.7% 49 92.69 0 0 2.7
Medio Atrato Choc￳ 4.8% 60.2% 100.0% 0 0.93 0 1 4.3
Pasca Cundinamarca 0.0% 0.0% 59.2% 89 91.72 0 0 1.6
Ricaurte Cundinamarca 0.0% 93.7% 54.3% 87 0.41 0 0 1.6
Puerto Gaitán Meta 35.2% 0.8% 80.5% 0 85.07 1 0 16.6
Cumbal Nari￱o 87.8% 0.0% 70.6% 57 89.95 0 0 1.7
La Playa Norte de Santander 0.0% 0.0% 82.3% 49 0.76 1 0 6.7
Toledo Norte de Santander 3.1% 0.5% 74.2% 54 98.59 1 0 2.3
Santuario Risaralda 0.6% 3.0% 62.7% 79 92.43 0 0 3.5
Barrancabermeja Santander 0.2% 16.2% 43.3% 100 93.26 1 0 13.8
Puerto Parra Santander 0.0% 18.9% 73.8% 61 74.1 1 0 6.7
Caimito Sucre 0.4% 4.5% 87.7% 55 43.41 0 0 2.0
El Roble Sucre 0.1% 10.3% 88.7% 0 0.36 0 0 1.5
San Benito Abad Sucre 3.7% 69.9% 90.9% 53 94.44 0 0 4.6
Ibagué Tolima 0.7% 1.2% 35.0% 100 98.21 0 0 2.4
Casabianca Tolima 0.1% 1.2% 76.6% 50 0.94 0 0 9.0
Coello Tolima 0.2% 0.0% 78.5% 54 95.53 0 0 2.4
Buenaventura Valle del Cauca 0.8% 83.6% 66.5% 0 0.14 1 1 3.8
Municipal average 7.3% 9.3% 0.0% 57 88.97 17% 1.8% 7.6
Sources
Demographic Census, 2005
% Poor National Planning Department (DNP), Colombia, based on census data
Roads index Social Foundation, 1985
% Households with electricity Census, 2005
Coca crops (dummy) SIMCI, 2000
Gold, oil, coal or emeralds (dummy) IGAC
Average homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants National Police, 1988-2010  14 
Once  the  municipalities  had  been  selected,  I  relied  on  a  short  survey  with  a 
heterogeneous group of key informants to map out variation in armed groups’ involvement 
in local institutions. I then stratified localities according to this measure, and randomly 
selected between two and four communities in each municipality. Map 1 shows the final 
sample of localities.8  
Map 1.  
Sample of Colombian localities with presence of non-state armed groups 
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In each selected community, my research team relied on focus groups to create 
time-lines and identify key events to help respondents recall past events. Participants also 
collectively identified how a set of institutions changed over time. We then conducted a 
semi-structured interview with each participant to gather more detailed evidence on the 
history  of  several  local  institutions,  state  presence,  community  organization,  and  the 
interaction between communities and armed actors over time. Participants were selected 
from  heterogeneous  groups  and  almost  always  included  a  teacher,  a  local  leader,  a 
merchant, and an elderly person. Women were present in all workshops. Using both the 
quantitative and qualitative data collected in the field, I created a dataset with a rich, 
detailed description of how armed groups penetrated local communities, how civilians 
responded, and what kind of institutions operated over time. 9  
In what follows I present some of the results to illustrate the range of variation in 
wartime institutions. Given that in some localities several armed groups were present at the 
same time—sometimes establishing different institutions—the unit of analysis is not the 
locality-year, but the locality-armed group-year. Structuring the data in this way allows for 
assessing what different armed groups did when operating at the same time and location.10  
 
Wartime institutions under guerrillas and paramilitaries 
The sample includes 1,328 observations on 90 dyads made up of 71 communities and 11 
armed groups that interacted for at least six months, between 1970 and 2012. Since this is 
                                                        
9 There are issues with memory, to be sure, but given the lack of archives or any other source where such 
changes have been registered for a few communities—let alone for a representative sample—we have to 
rely on oral testimonies. The combination of focus groups, interviews and secondary sources allows for 
triangulating sources and decreasing measurement problems. For further details, please the online 
methodological appendix. 
10 All descriptive statistics use this unit of analysis, unless where noticed. Sampling weights are used in all 
figures.   16 
a study of wartime institutions, the panel only includes localities where at least one non-
state armed group was present at any point in time. Given that some communities interacted 
with  armed  groups for  thirty  years while others  did  so  for a few  years,  the panel  is 
unbalanced.  
Institutions  vary  greatly  across  and  within  armed  groups,  across  and  within 
localities, and over time. To simplify, I present the data aggregating all locality-group 
dyads over time. In most cases, I show separate descriptive statistics for guerrillas and 
paramilitaries.  
I  start  with  a  general  description  of  these  conflict  zones.  About  44%  of  all 
communities interacted with at least one non-state armed group during more than ten years 
between 1968 and 2012; in 33% of the cases, armed groups were present between 5 and 10 
years; and in 23% of the cases, presence lasted less than five years (Figure 1). This means 
that the sample includes communities that have interacted with armed actors for many 
years, as well as communities where such actors were present only for a few years. In some 
communities only one group was present throughout the years, whereas in others many 
groups coexisted (Figure 2). For the most part, however, communities interacted with one 
group at a time (80% of all locality-years), while periods with two or more groups were far 
less common (20%). When more than one group was present, in about a third of the cases 
they were fighting each other; in the rest of the cases, they coexisted peacefully under some 
deal.  
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Figure 1 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
*Note: in this figure, the unit of analysis is the locality-year, not the 
locality-armed group dyad-year. 
 
As Figure 3 shows, in more than half of the cases armed groups were present in the 
locality all day or weekly. Combatants showed up only once per month or a few times per   18 
year  in  about  35%  of  the  cases  under  guerrilla  presence,  and  20%  of  those  under 
paramilitary presence.  
 
Figure 3 
 
 
Turning to institutions, civilians describe most of the time they lived under the 
presence of an armed actor as one where clear rules—either formal or informal—
regulated conduct: in 80% of all observations civilians knew what rules they had to 
follow. Where do these rules come from? 
A first way to investigate wartime institutions is by looking at who rules. We asked 
respondents  about  who,  in  general,  run  their  communities  at  specific  points  in  time, 
allowing for multiple choices.11 Armed groups  ruled in about 55% of all cases; state 
authorities such as the police or the major ruled in 32% of the cases; civilian leaders like a 
priest or a civic leader ruled in 18% of the cases, including the indigenous cabildo or the 
                                                        
11 In Spanish the term is “mandar”, which is not only linked to ruling but more generally to imparting 
orders or being the one who makes decisions.    19 
Afro Colombian communitary councils (Figure 4). It is important to stress that neither 
guerrillas nor paramilitaries ruled in all the localities where they were present; rather, there 
is substantial variation over time and space in whether or not they became de facto rulers 
in the areas where they were present. 
 
Figure 4 
 
 
This complex distribution of power brings to the fore an important aspect of 
wartime local governance: the interplay of state, societal, and rebel forces as creators of 
institutions. Social actors shape rebel strategy in various ways, as combatants have to 
react to authority structures, local norms, and social cohesion in their attempt to control 
civilian behavior (Arjona, 2013; Barter, 2014). The state can also shape wartime 
institutions in those places where, despite the presence of non-state armed actors, state 
agencies remain in place. There is great variation in the intensity of state presence in 
conflict zones: while weak states may be unable to provide any services in peripheral 
areas under rebel control, in countries with stronger states public agencies may operate   20 
even when rebels own the monopoly over the use of violence, as the cases of India and 
Colombia indicate. Often, rebels directly seize resources from the coffers of public 
agencies; sometimes they redirect services and resources to their support base—a practice 
that Colombian scholars have called armed clientelism (Peñate, 1999). The relation 
between non-state armed groups and the state is quite complex, as the former may 
influence, coopt, coerce or ally with public servants (Arjona, 2009; Staniland, 2012).  
The complexity of these relationships can be illustrated by looking at national 
elections, which in Colombia have been held for years despite the ongoing war. Guerrillas 
usually forced people not to vote, and paramilitaries mostly told them who to vote for 
(Figure 10). In local elections, however, both groups often vetoed who could run for office, 
chose a candidate to support, and mobilized or coerced people to vote for that candidate. 
At the same time, in some territories none of the groups intervened in elections despite 
being present there.  
 
Figure 5 
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How do these social, state, and rebel actors rule? Preserving public order is a key 
concern, and all three established norms and enforcement mechanisms to regulate certain 
conducts. Those in charge usually forbade stealing, killing, and raping. Again, there is 
great variation in who becomes the authority figure in charge of these issues: in about 
50% of the cases, civilians turned to combatants to solve problems related to public 
order; in about 40%, they turned to the local government (the mayor or the police), and in 
about 20% locals relied on civic leaders or informal mechanisms. Very few sought the 
local courts (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6 
 
 
Civilians also relied on different kinds of institutions to solve interpersonal 
conflicts. When confronting a problem over a land border, about half of the communities 
usually turned to the armed actor—either guerrillas or paramilitaries. In the other half, 
combatants did not become the de facto court; rather, civilians would turn to the mayor or   22 
the police (40%). A low percentage would resolve the problem in some other way or turn 
to the courts (Figure 7).  
Figure 7 
 
 
Economic activities are also regulated in different ways in war zones. Mandatory 
contributions to the armed actors (often called revolutionary taxes) were common in many 
cases but not all of them. Guerrillas imposed such taxes in about half of the localities where 
they were present. The rate is slightly higher for paramilitaries (Figure 8).  
 
Figure 8 
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Armed groups regulated legal and illegal economic activities in some localities but 
not all. Fishing, hunting, and wood extraction were regulated mostly by the guerrillas, 
whereas paramilitaries were more likely to regulate illegal mining. Both armed actors 
regulated the cultivation of coca leaves, and in a small percentage of communities had a 
say on who would receive state subsidies (Figure 9).  
 
Figure 9 
 
 
In some places,  guerrillas and paramilitaries created norms to regulate private 
conduct. The patterns are quite similar across guerrillas and paramilitaries: they regulated 
mobility and free speech in about half of the localities where they were present; they 
regulated personal image (like the use of skirts by women or earrings by men) and sexual 
behavior (like homosexual relations and prostitution) in about 20% of these places (Figure 
10). There is variation within a single community over time as well, as some communities 
lived under these rules in some periods but not others. 
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Figure 10 
 
 
Institutions established by the armed groups were more or less formal depending 
on the armed group and the territory. In about half of the communities where a guerrilla 
group was present, the commander discussed at meetings the specific rules that everyone 
had to follow; paramilitaries did so in about two thirds of all the localities where they were 
present.  In  others,  these  were  made  clear  in  more  subtle  ways,  for  example  through 
interventions by militiamen. 
   
 
3. Conceptualizing variation 
As the data shows, institutions vary greatly: across different spheres of local life, within 
and across armed groups, and over time and space. As with any phenomenon, there are 
many ways in which we could conceptualize this variation, and several typologies to 
capture it. Following Gerring (2001:380), “the utility of a concept is enhanced by its ability 
to ‘bundle’ characteristics. The greater the number of properties shared by the phenomena   25 
in the extension, the greater the depth of a concept.” I propose to conceptualize these local 
realities as the particular form of social order that operates at a given time and location. 
The term social order has been used to refer to different phenomena. It has been defined 
as the existence of predictability and as the emergence of cooperation. Disorder can thus 
have different meanings: one related to situations of chaos or lack of predictability, and 
another to instances where cooperation fails. In sociology, social order is often used to 
denote the particular set of shared norms that regulate the interaction among members of a 
given community. 
The concept that I propose captures both the existence of predictability, and the 
particular institutions that structure human interaction in a locality at a given time. Since 
the focus of the analysis is on the ways in which war triggers the emergence of new 
institutions, I am not concerned about social order broadly conceived, but rather about how 
it is affected by the presence and behavior of non-state armed groups. Hence, I define 
wartime social order as the existence—or lack thereof—of predictability of civilian and 
combatant behavior, and the norms that sustain it. Hence, the concept aims to capture the 
particular ways in which local institutions are shaped by war in any realm of private and 
public life. 
Social order in a war zone can vary across multiple dimensions. I propose a typology 
on the basis of two dimensions (Table 2).  
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Table 2. A typology of wartime social orders 
 
Scope of armed groups’ 
intervention in civilian affairs 
Narrow  Broad 
Social contract between armed 
groups and local population 
Yes  Aliocracy  Rebelocracy 
No  Disorder 
 
First, whether a social contract has been established between the armed groups and 
the local community, by which I mean that both sides have obligations towards each other. 
To be sure, this contract is seldom spelled out; yet, every social order relies on an implicit 
notion  of  what  the  duties  or  commitments  of  both  the  ruler  and  the  ruled  are.  This 
dimension can be operationalized as the existence of norms of behavior for both armed 
groups and civilians.12  
If there is no social contract between the local community and the armed groups that 
are present in the area, the latter do not commit to abide by any rule. This unconstrained 
power leaves civilians with few solid beliefs about what the likely outcomes of alternative 
choices are. Although civilian behavior might be strictly controlled, the absence of limits 
for those in power lead to high levels of unpredictability. A parallel with an impulsive  
dictator or the state of exception in a democracy serves to illustrate this situation: the 
government in power has a tight control over the population, and at the same time displays 
unpredictable behavior. I refer to this situation as disorder.13 
                                                        
12 Other authors have approached the relation between armed actors and local populations by focusing on 
whether or not a social contract is established (Wickham-Crowley 1987; Metelits 2010). However, they only 
look at whether a contract exists or not, overlooking variation in institutions. 
13 There is variation, of course, in the level of abuse armed groups may display when they fail to establish 
clear terms for their interaction with civilians. Disorder is defined as situations where armed groups do not 
commit to respect specific rules, but it does not imply that combatants behave randomly, or that internal   27 
When a social contract between the local population and the armed group does exist, 
the form of social order varies depending on the scope of the group’s intervention in local 
institutions, which can be broad or narrow.  
Armed groups’ broad intervention entails regulating local life beyond security and 
material subsistence, including spheres of life such as the administration of local resources, 
politics, economic activities, and private behavior such as religious practices and sexual 
conduct. I use the term rebelocracy—or the rule of rebels—to denote situations where an 
armed group establishes a social contract with a local population in which the former 
becomes the de facto ruler in this broad sense.  The specific domains over which the armed 
group rules can vary, but for rebelocracy to exist, intervention has to go beyond the 
maintenance of public order and the collection of material contributions. The channels 
through which the group rules can vary as well: in some places, it relies on combatants who 
are permanently deployed in the locality and exert a direct form of rule; in others, it relies 
on militiamen, who are part-time members of the organization, within the community (and 
often are members of it), and report directly to a commander; in other cases, the group rules 
through  a  pre-existing  political  party  that  is  allied  with  the  armed  group,  or  through 
organizations that freely support it or that have been widely infiltrated, co-opted, or even 
created by the armed actor—like unions, boards, cooperatives, or even the formal local 
government.  
Narrow intervention entails any situation in which the group only regulates behaviors 
linked to security (such as providing information to the enemy), and to civilians’ material 
contribution to the group (usually the provision of food or regular payments). Within this 
                                                        
rules that constrain their behavior towards civilians disappear. Some scholars may find that disaggregating 
disorder is useful to study a particular research question.   28 
social contract, the role of combatants resembles that of a minimal state, as their regulatory 
role does not go beyond the spheres of security and taxation. Civilians, on their part, are 
expected to follow the rules that the group imposes regarding security and taxation, but are 
free to otherwise manage their own affairs. I refer to this form of social order as aliocracy, 
or the rule of others.14  
 
Assessing the quality of the typology 
How good is this typology? Although there is no consensus on the criteria to evaluate 
concepts and typologies (Gerring 1999; Doty and Glick 1994), a good typology has to meet 
at least three conditions, beyond internal consistency: (i) it should identify variation that 
matters either because we have reasons to inquire about its causes, or because we can 
expect it to shape relevant phenomena; (ii) it should identify types where within-group 
variation is minimized, and between-group variation is maximized; and (iii) it should be 
parsimonious:  it  should  identify  as  few  types  as  possible  while  having  the  greatest 
descriptive and explanatory potential. In the remaining of this section I show that this 
typology is parsimonious in the sense of being simple and, yet, having great descriptive 
potential. I also show that it yields distinct types that are internally homogeneous. In the 
next section I discuss the relevance of the concept as both a dependent variable and an 
explanatory factor in our study of other phenomena. 
  The first way to assess whether the typology captures types that exist on the ground 
is by looking at actual cases (i.e. war zones or conflict areas) in very different contexts and 
see if we find disorder, aliocracy and rebelocracy. Although systematic data on wartime 
                                                        
14 From the Latin word alio, which means “other”.   29 
local institutions is hard to find, there is plenty of detailed, qualitative evidence on armed 
groups and conflict zones around the world. A survey of this literature suggests that, 
indeed, the typology captures three ideal types that are often found on the ground.15 
Accounts of armed groups bringing about disorder when occupying territories 
abound. The groups fighting in Sierra Leone and Liberia, for example, are best known for 
their predatory strategies and limited observance of rules (e.g. Weinstein 2007; Ellis 1998; 
Johnston 2004). However, even those groups that are known for ruling civilians often 
display this type of unconstrained behavior, especially when trying to take over a territory 
for the first time, or when defending it from their enemies. 
Situations of order—that is, where clear rules regulate conduct—are quite common, 
despite the widespread association of war and anarchy. Some authors actually describe the 
change brought by war as the emergence of a new order (e.g. Weber 1981; Lubkemann 
2008; and Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2004). What are the foundations of this new 
order? Case studies from very different civil wars provide evidence of both aliocracy and 
rebelocracy. 
Several descriptions fit with the definition of aliocracy. In these cases, rebel groups 
control a territory and behave like a minimal state, dealing only with public order and 
taxation. Other spheres of life are regulated by norms that come from various sources, 
including  the  state,  traditional  authorities,  and  local  leaders.  Cases  in  which  a  group 
establishes an indirect form of rule fall into this category: an underlying agreement between 
the armed group and the community —or its ruler—leads the group not to interfere in 
civilians’ affairs, as far as locals meet a set of obligations. Renamo in most occupied 
                                                        
15 In this paper I only provide a few examples to illustrate the applicability of the typology beyond 
Colombia. For a more comprehensive discussion of these and other cases see Arjona (2013).   30 
territories in Mozambique established this form of presence. Traditional chiefs, known as 
regulos, ruled civilian affairs, but they had to ensure food provision to Renamo, as well as 
civilians’ abidance to a set of norms (Young 1997b; Weinstein 2007; Geffray 1990).  
Similarly, accounts of the interaction between the SPLM in Sudan and local communities 
in Tei Town portray the relation between the SPLM and civilians as a tense agreement, in 
which local chiefs assured some minimal compliance in exchange for greater safety of the 
community (e.g. Johnson 1998).    
The  existence  of  a  social  order  of  rebelocracy  in  war  zones  has  received  little 
attention—often, even experts on civil wars doubt they exist at all. The emerging literature 
on rebel governance mentioned in the introduction has helped to counter this omission, 
especially by showing that armed groups often provide public goods. In an effort to show 
that rebelocracies are indeed common and warrant attention, I mention a few cases across 
the globe.  
In Africa, descriptions of rebels providing public goods and creating new institutions 
abound. The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), for example, provided health care, 
education,  and  dispute-resolution  schemes.  They  also  implemented  land  reform,  and 
created a formal system of taxation and political councils (Pool 2001; Barnabas and Zwi 
1997; Connell 2001; Cliffe  1984). The Tigray’s People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in 
Ethiopia is also known for its provision of services and implementation of land reform 
(Young 1997a, 1998:42). The National Resistance Army (NRA) and the Rwenzururu 
Kingdom Government in Uganda have also been described as insurgencies engaged with 
ruling civilians comprehensively (Kasfir 2005; Weinstein 2007).    31 
Insurgencies  in  Latin  America  have  also  established  rebelocracies.  Wickham-
Crowley (1987, 1991b) provides a comprehensive list of insurgent groups from the 1950s 
to the 1970s that behaved as rulers in areas where they operated—including both well-
known cases, like Cuba and Nicaragua, and more obscure ones, like Venezuela. In Cuba, 
the creation of administrative councils to deal with public health, the collection of taxes, 
and the enactment of new laws has been described by Guevara  (1997) himself, as well as 
by others (McColl 1969).  
Asia and Europe are not an exception. The Liberation Tamil Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) in Sri Lanka ruled civilian affairs in a comprehensive fashion. Mampilly (2011) 
and Stokke (2006) offer a detailed account of their effective civil administration, which 
included education and health systems, a legal code with its corresponding judiciary, a 
police force, and even a bank. The Maoist Rebels of Nepal also created institutions to 
distribute land and food, and set up courts to solve disputes (Kattel 2003). The resistance 
groups that fought against Soviet occupation in Afghanistan developed a bureaucracy that, 
while not sophisticated, was in charge of several regulatory tasks in local territories (Sinno 
2008:126-7; Rubin 2002). The Taliban also engaged early on in state-like activities in areas 
where they were present in Afghanistan (Sinno 2008). Mao’s Chinese People Liberation 
Army was also known for engaging with civilian rule. Provision of public goods and 
institutions by rebels in Europe was also documented in the case of Greece (Kalyvas, 2013; 
McColl, 1969).   
Evidence on militias and counterinsurgent irregular groups is more difficult to find, 
as these groups are understudied. However, some case studies suggest that they often 
establish rebelocracies. For example, in the different armed conflicts that Afghanistan has   32 
endured over the last decades, several non-state armed groups often became the de facto 
guarantors of local order, provided public goods, and co-opted or eliminated other sources 
of  authority  in  their  areas  of  influence.  Warlords’  organizations  like  Massoud’s  and 
Wahdat—two of the many that were competing for power after the Najib regime collapsed 
in 1992—created and developed civilian institutions in some of the territories under their 
influence (Sinno 2008:193, 217).  
This evidence suggests that, indeed, the typology I propose captures variation that 
we see in war zones. Yet, it is a very simple typology that classifies rebels’ influence on 
institutions, when institutions do exist, into two discrete categories. Are rebelocracy and 
aliocracy capturing two distinct realities? 
Since this typology was developed in 2009, before collecting the data, a good test of 
its parsimony is inspecting the data to see if the typology captures “natural” groups. Using 
k-means cluster analysis we can calculate the Euclidean distance between observations on 
the basis of measures of the dimension the typology is trying to capture, to wit, armed 
groups’ influence on local institutions. Based on this distance, we can identify two groups 
or clusters that are homogeneous—that is, each cluster contains elements that are as close 
as possible to the other elements in the cluster.  
I use five indicators of armed groups’ influence in local institutions. Each is an index 
ranging from 0 to 1, measuring armed groups’ influence on a domain of local life based on 
a series of variables. “Public goods” measures whether the group provided education, 
health or infrastructure either directly or by pressing the local authorities; “economy” 
measures whether the group regulated different legal or illegal economic activities in the 
locality; “justice” measures whether the group became the de facto court—that is, if people   33 
turned to it to solve conflicts; “politics” measures whether the group intervened in locals’ 
decision to vote and for whom; “norms over private conduct” measures whether the group 
established norms to regulate sexual practices, personal image, mobility, free speech, or 
domestic violence.  
If we graph the mean of the different proxies of armed groups’ influence on local 
institutions by cluster, we can get a sense of how similar the elements in cluster 1 are to 
each other, and how different they are from the elements in cluster 2. I find that there is, 
indeed, a strong positive correlation between all the different indexes within each cluster, 
and a strong, negative correlation between all indexes across both clusters. This means that 
armed  groups’  intervention  in  local  institutions  tends  to  be  either  broad  or  narrow, 
regardless which sphere of local life we look at. This result suggests that the simple, 
minimalist typology presented in the previous section does a good job at capturing two 
very distinct types whose elements share many attributes. The results of the cluster analysis 
are not sensitive to adding or dropping variables or changing the seed. 
 
Figure 12 
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If we look at other variables that capture additional kinds of intervention by armed 
groups on local life, the results remain unchanged. In Figure 13 I include “social”, which 
refers to whether combatants participated in social events like soccer games, drinking beer 
with locals, or attending parties; I also include “security”, which captures whether the 
group protected civilians from other groups and whether people felt very secure at that 
time. Still, cluster 1 shows low levels of intervention and cluster 2 shows high levels. 
 
Figure 13 
 
 
In sum, armed groups’ intervention in different spheres of life tends to co-vary; that 
is, in most cases, when a guerrilla or paramilitary group intervenes in politics, it also 
intervenes in economic activities and social relations. Likewise, when a group abstains 
from interviewing in one sphere, it tends to also neglect other domains of life.  
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4. Discussion: the explanatory power of wartime institutions  
The evidence I have provided shows that institutions do operate in many conflict areas, and 
that the level of influence that armed groups have on those institutions varies greatly. If we 
know—from political science, sociology, and economics—that norms shape behavior, why 
do we dismiss their relevance when studying decision-making in the midst of war?  
My  theoretical  prior  is  that  in  wartime—as  in  peacetime—institutions  can  shape 
available alternatives and payoffs, beliefs, and preferences via different mechanisms. They 
can also transform the nature of civilian-combatant relations, which can in turn have 
different effects on actors’ choices. In this section I illustrate the explanatory power of 
wartime institutions by giving a few examples of how different types of wartime social 
order may shape phenomena at the micro- and macro-level, as well as our strategies to 
investigate them.  
The first way in which taking into account wartime social orders can illuminate our 
study of civil war is by questioning the validity of common assumptions in theories of 
different  phenomena.  Macro-level  theories  usually  assume  that  civilians  have  little 
agency—they are either politically supportive of rebels or coerced by them—and even 
micro-level  theories  that  take  agency  into  account  tend  to  theorize  choices  within 
institutional vacuums. Similarly, armed groups are thought to rely only on violence to 
achieve their ends, leaving many strategies—like transforming local institutions—out of 
the analysis. In as far as armed actors strategically shape institutions, and such institutions 
influence  actors’  choices,  the  premises  on  which  many  theories  are  built  should  be 
reconsidered.   36 
Incorporating institutions in our analysis of the conduct of war can improve theory 
building in at least three ways. First, armed groups’ strategies might be explained at least 
partially  by  their  desire  to  establish  certain  institutions;  second,  once  in  place,  those 
institutions condition combatants’ choices; and third, those institutions also shape civilians’ 
decision-making. I illustrate the potential insights that can come from investigating these 
causal links with a few examples. 
Violence could be better understood if we consider the institutional context in which 
it is used. Kalyvas (2006) has convincingly argued that selective violence against non-
combatants at the local level is shaped by the distribution of territorial control between the 
warring sides. Following this theory, violence should be higher in areas where two or more 
armed groups fight for control (unless control is evenly shared), because civilians have 
higher incentives to share information on defectors, which in turn leads to selective violence. 
Yet, local institutions may shape civilians’ decision to share information with armed actors; 
communities  living  in  rebelocracy  might  be  more  likely  to  share  information  than 
communities that preserve their institutions. If some communities are more likely to deny 
information on defectors to all armed groups, selective violence can be less likely, whereas 
indiscriminate violence can be more common. Hence, the logic of violence can vary within 
disputed or controlled territories depending on wartime local institutions.  
Furthermore, violence can serve other purposes beyond punishing and preventing 
collaboration with the enemy: it may be used to bring about a particular form of social order, 
and also to preserve it. Violence is thus not just a way to deter defection to the enemy 
(Kalyvas 2006) or a by-product of poor recruitment (Weinstein 2007), but a tool to enforce   37 
all new institutions. Understanding the use of violence in these cases requires treating it as a 
means for governing and creating a particular type of social order. 
Institutions can also be crucial to our understanding of armed groups’ capacity to 
expand. It might be that controlling a territory is a function of the group’s capacity to bring 
about rebelocracy: norms on economic, political, and social affairs can shape local dynamics 
in ways that allow armed groups to get goods, information, and support. Understanding the 
conditions under which armed groups are able to set up the institutions they want can give 
us clues about where they expand, how they do it, and why they succeed or fail. 
Investigating wartime social orders can also illuminate our study of civilian choice 
in war zones. A parallel between the existence of distinct social orders and regime types is 
useful to think about the effects that such variation may have on civilian behavior. As with 
any regime—like democracy or dictatorship—the specific characteristics of these social 
orders  have  far-reaching  consequences  on  their  inhabitants.  They  determine  the  set  of 
forbidden behaviors and individual rights; the actor or organization that they seek for solving 
their conflicts; the persons and institutions they have to obey; the existence of channels to 
communicate with those who command them; and the availability of procedures to defend 
themselves when accused of misconduct. Even their private life—how they dress, what their 
sexual choices are—can be subjected to strict regulation.  
One of the shortcomings of the literature on civilian choices in civil war has been 
abstracting  the  institutional  contexts  in  which  such  choices  are  made.  This  neglect  is 
consequential for our study of key phenomena like civilian collaboration, recruitment, and 
displacement. Whether a social contract exists between a community and a group, and what 
specific behaviors the group adopts, should be taken into account when trying to understand   38 
why civilians behave in the way they do in war zones. Furthermore, understanding civilian 
choice requires carefully theorizing how armed groups’ influence in so many aspects of local 
life can transform shared beliefs, create new sets of available alternatives, awaken emotions 
that change preferences, and create new ways of reading the local (and national) status quo. 
Taking into account how the combination of violent and non-violent conducts transforms 
local and individual life is essential to better understand how civilians experience war, and 
how they go about making choices. 
Institutions can also be crucial as mediators of the effects of conflict. Research on 
the consequences of war on health, education or economic wellbeing need to take into 
account the ways in which wartime institutions may catalyze or ameliorate the effects of 
war. Similarly, studies on the political and social legacies of conflict need to consider the 
role of local institutions. Recent studies have found that violence increases collective action 
(e.g.  e.g.  Blattman and  Annan 2009; Bellows and Miguel  2009; Gilligan et  al.  2010); 
however, a thorough understanding of the ways in which social order is transformed by war 
is essential to identify causal paths.  
Finally, the existence of wartime social orders also has implications on the validity 
of measures that are commonly used in studies of the micro-dynamics of civil war. Scholars 
use  different  proxies  of  armed  groups’  presence  to  investigate  rebel  behavior  or  war 
outcomes; those proxies often rely on simplistic assumptions about local order in conflict 
areas. For example, inferring that violence is a good proxy of presence (e.g. Acemoglu et. al 
2009) may lead to excluding precisely those places where armed groups have permeated 
institutions and local life to such extent that little violence is needed and, if used, is unlikely 
to be denounced.   39 
Turning to the macro-level, there are many ways in which understanding the role of 
local institutions can advance our understanding of the conduct of war at an aggregate level. 
To start with, advances in our study of individuals’ choices illuminate questions on macro-
level outcomes. As I mentioned before, all claims about the onset, conduct, and termination 
of war rely to some extent on assumptions about how actors react on the ground. The better 
our theories on individual choices, the stronger the foundations of our theories on macro-
level outcomes. 
More directly, inquiring about wartime institutions can give us clues about how war 
evolves over time. If transforming local institutions and establishing rebelocracy is essential 
for holding territorial control over the long run, only certain rebel groups may be able to 
fight long wars. Clearly, rebelocracy is not equally likely everywhere; the more fertile the 
ground for rebel rule, the more likely it is that rebels keep their strongholds, as combating a 
group that has managed to rule populations tightly across the country is more difficult than 
confronting one that has only achieved military control. If correct, this line of reasoning 
could shed light onto the conditions for the onset and duration of civil war. 
Another implication has to do with democracy in contexts of civil war. If non-state 
armed  groups  are  likely  to  co-opt  or  capture  existing  authorities  and  elections  can  be 
manipulated by combatants, serious questions arise about the workings of democracy in 
contexts of civil war. On one hand, the capture of democracy leads to all sorts of normative 
questions about the push for democracy in civil war.  On the other hand, it raises issues 
related to the strategic use that armed groups can make of democracy as a means to acquire 
both power and legitimacy. What is the effect of democracy on rebels’ strength or bargaining 
power? How does democracy alter the odds of success of alternative means to end conflict?     40 
Research on local institutions can also make a tremendous contribution to the study 
of counterinsurgency. The debate about how “to drain the water in which the fish swim” has 
taken armies around the world to try indiscriminate violence, selective violence, and civic-
military operations. The U.S. has recently embraced an approach that makes great emphasis 
on the provision of infrastructure and both private and public goods. If institutions shape 
civilian collaboration and, therefore, armed groups’ capacity to preserve territorial control, 
counterinsurgency should pay greater attention to institutions. Furthermore, recipes that 
work well in some contexts may fail in others precisely due to institutional changes brought 
by war. Assuming that wartime interventions operate in an institutional vacuum hinders our 
capacity to identify the effects of alternative policies. 
Turning to post-conflict studies, by identifying variation in civilians’ experience of 
war, this study calls for a more disaggregated approach to post-conflict outcomes. The 
presence of armed groups brings about profound changes to local communities, shaping not 
only how the war affects them (as victims), but also how they react (as agents). Variation in 
wartime social order is, therefore, likely to  transcend the war, creating  challenges  and 
opportunities for reconciliation, reconstruction, and development. 
More generally, different kinds of institutions, including those coming from state 
agencies and traditional authorities, can be deeply transformed by the rules that operate 
during war. If fostering trust on the state, recovering the authority of traditional institutions, 
or promoting community cohesion are among the challenges that post-war societies face, 
understanding the ways in which war transforms social order is a necessary step.  
Finally,  the  importance  of  wartime  institutions  is  not  merely  their  potential 
explanatory power of other wartime or post-war phenomena. Variation in local institutions   41 
during war is itself a phenomenon that warrants explanation. Understanding why order 
emerges in war zones and what form it takes is an important question as it relates to 
civilians’ experiences of war, armed groups’ strategies, and wartime transformation of a 
key aspect of society. Even more, the question on why rebels—or counter-rebels—manage 
to rule communities or fail to do so is essentially a question about how order is created, 
preserved, and destroyed. 
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